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In order to relate the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory uniquely to measurement
results, one has to conceive of an ensemble of identically prepared copies of the quantum system
under study. Since the universe is the total domain of physical experience, it cannot be copied,
not even in a thought experiment. Therefore, a quantum state of the whole universe can never be
made accessible to empirical test. Hence the existence of such a state is only a metaphysical idea.
Despite prominent claims to the contrary, recent developments in the quantum-interpretation
debate do not invalidate this conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
A hundred years after Planck’s quantum hypothesis, quantum theory seems to be universally valid. While it has
its roots in the atomic and subatomic domain, the stability of matter, diamagnetism and superconductivity are
examples of quantum effects in the macroscopic domain. A fundamental limitation on the applicability of quantum
theory has not been accepted so far. The formalism of general quantum theory allows one to incorporate into a
single quantum description additional degrees of freedom as a subsystem, for example a heat bath or a detector
in a laboratory. The formalism contains no fundamental obstacle to the description of an arbitrary compound of
physical microsystems. Thus it is tempting to think even of the universe as a whole in terms of quantum theory [1].
Of course, nobody can explicitly specify a quantum state of the universe [2]. Nevertheless, assuming its existence
in principle is enough to construct theoretical models of a quantum universe and to study their predictions, at least
at a formal level. Demanding research programs, such as quantum gravity and quantum cosmology [3–5], partially
rest on this idea.
In spite of these efforts, in this article we will demonstrate that the very concept of a “quantum state of the
universe” is doomed to failure. While this conclusion is not entirely new [6], we feel that it has not received the
attention it deserves. Indeed, publications employing a quantum state of the universe, in whatever specification,
continue to appear. Therefore, our goal here is to reconsider this concept and clearly present arguments decisive
for its rejection. In this way we also declare our position in the recently revived debate on the meaning of quantum
theory.
The logical structure of our reasoning is as follows. Taking (U), (F) and (MI) for granted, it follows that
(QU) is excluded. Here (U) stands for a definition of the concept of “universe”, (F) for the principle that the
interpretation of any physical theory has to rely on facts, (MI) for a minimal interpretation of quantum theory,
and (QU) for the claim that there is a quantum state of the universe. Those who tend to escape our conclusion
have to decide which of our assumptions they regard as closest to dispensable.
The article is organized as follows. In section II we specify explicitly (U), (F) and (MI). Section III contains our
reasoning against (QU). In the last section, we discuss and refute possible objections in an interplay of questions
and answers.
II. PREREQUISITES
We start with the specification of (U), which defines the most extended object of physical description.
(U) Definition of the Universe. The (physical) universe is the union of all objects and phenomena which
are empirically accessible in principle.
Two explanations are in order.
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1. An object or phenomenon is empirically accessible only if it is intersubjectively perceptible and communicable.
Here it is irrelevant whether a living being is actually observing the object or phenomenon. All that matters is
that an observation is possible at any time. Empirical accessibility may well require sophisticated experimental
manipulations or technical means for observation.
2. “In principle” means “supposing perfect measurement apparatuses”. What is to be considered as empirically
accessible in principle does not depend on the current state of measurement-device technique. In this sense,
cosmic background radiation was “empirically accessible in principle” already in antiquity. In contrast,
if quantum theory is true, simultaneous values of mutually incompatible observables are not empirically
accessible in principle.
To give some motivation for the principle (F), we first recall the purpose of interpretations of physical theories
in general. The goal of an interpretation is a unique relation between the mathematical formalism of the theory
and the objects and phenomena which are to be described. Roughly speaking, an interpretation of a physical
theory is a set of mapping principles relating certain elements of the mathematical formalism to certain elements
of physical reality. If one knows the objects and phenomena to be described, the interpretation shows how to apply
the formalism. Vice versa, if one knows the formalism, the interpretation shows which objects and phenomena the
theory is able to describe.
(F) Principle of Relation to Facts. Every interpretation of a physical theory has to relate certain elements
of the mathematical formalism of the theory to conceivable facts.
Some explanations are in order.
1. Here a fact is only what is empirically accessible in principle in a single measurement on an individual system.
2. Conceivable facts are facts that may but need not exist in reality, supposing the theory is exactly valid. They
are the kind of facts considered in thought experiments. We note that in some situations it is empirically
clear that they do not exist in reality, as is the case in counterfactual reasoning [7].
3. The purpose of the concept of conceivable facts is not to test the empirical adequacy of the theory (for that
the real facts are decisive), but only to specify the testible statements of the theory. Strictly speaking, the
theory can only be tested empirically when its interpretation has been specified by means of conceivable facts.
In this sense, interpretation is a precondition of testability.
4. Principle (F) excludes an understanding of “interpretation” in the broad sense of attributing “meaning” to
a theoretical concept by means of free human imagination regardless of any empirical relevance. Specula-
tive imagination in physics, useful as it is for the invention of new hypotheses, has to pay tribute to the
methodological basis of theoretical concepts, which is epitomized in principle (F).
Examples of conceivable facts are the values of all observables in classical mechanics. A probability density on
phase space is not a conceivable fact, since it incorporates some ignorance about the classical system under consid-
eration. However, the point in phase space that describes the “real” state of the system represents a conceivable
fact, even if it is not precisely known (which is the typical situation in classical statistical mechanics).
In quantum theory, all internal parameters that characterize a quantum system (such as mass, spin, charge etc.)
stand for conceivable facts. In contrast, a value of a quantum observable (such as position, energy, orbital angular
momentum etc.) is never assigned as a fact to a system in all of its states that show quantum uncertainty for
this observable, namely in its non-eigenstates. Also, it is not a conceivable fact that a certain Schro¨dinger wave
function (in other words, pure state) is given, since this function cannot be tested by a single measurement on
an individual system. Hidden variables would be connected with conceivable facts (hence the efforts to introduce
them), but they are not part of the quantum formalism. In any case, results of measurements performed on an
individual quantum system are always conceivable facts.
Our third premise is the set of basic rules of how to apply quantum theory. These rules are almost uncontroversial
among the proponents of different quantum interpretations.
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(MI) Minimal Interpretation of Quantum Theory. Every state of a given quantum system yields prob-
abilistic predictions for all observables that can be measured on this system. More precisely, let the quantum
state W be represented by a positive trace-one operator W acting on some complex separable Hilbert space H,
and the observable A by a positive-operator-valued measure EA on a suitable set Ω with measurable subsets
X ⊆ Ω. Then the trace Tr [WEA(X)] is the probability of finding a result in X when A is measured on the
system in the state W .
Some comments apply.
1. Remarkably, the possible outcomes of measurements in the sense of experimental physics are related to the
notions “measure” and “measurable subset” in the sense of mathematical measure theory (see, for example
[8]). The real line R or suitable subsets of R are typical examples of the set Ω of the possible values of A.
2. The class of quantum observables represented by positive-operator-valued measures extends the more familiar
class of observables represented by self-adjoint operators in a substantial way [9]. In the special case that A is
represented by a self-adjoint operator A on H, the operator EA(X) is simply given by the spectral projection
of A associated with X ⊆ Ω ⊆ R, in symbols, EA(X) = IX(A). Here IX is the indicator function of the set
X .
3. The essence of (MI) does not depend on the formal frame in which quantum theory is formulated. Observables
and states may be represented, as above, by operators on a Hilbert space, or they may, more abstractly, be
postulated as elements of a suitable algebra and as positive linear functionals on this algebra, respectively.
The choice of a specific mathematical axiomatization is irrelevant to the subsequent reasoning.
4. (MI) does not ascribe a value of A to the quantum system before A was measured, not even in the simple
case that A is represented by a self-adjoint operator with a purely discrete spectrum. After each single mea-
surement, however, a measurement result must be assigned to the individual system as a fact. The relative
frequency of the occurrence of such facts in suitable experiments is just what the probability Tr [WEA(X)]
predicts. Indeed, the only way to interpret probabilities in physics is to compare them with relative frequen-
cies, that is, to interpret them statistically. Details are given in the next section.
III. REASONING
Our reasoning against a quantum state of the universe goes as follows. For the physical interpretation of a
quantum state in accordance with (F) and (MI), it has to be conceivable in principle to produce an (infinite)
collection of measurement results as facts for every observable, to “read them off” and to determine their relative
frequencies. The interpretation of the quantum probability prediction about the observable A in state W then
implies equating the probability Tr [WEA(X)] with the relative frequency of measurement results in X , for all
X ⊆ Ω. Actually, the empirical significance ofW can be illustrated completely by the histograms of such collections
of results for all observables that are conceivably being measured in the state W .
Every single measurement of an observable A on any quantum system produces just one fact. For the empirical
significance of the quantum state W it is irrelevant, whether different quantum systems of the same type are
prepared at the same time into the state W , or the same quantum system is repeatedly prepared into the state
W at different times. In either case, an ensemble of identically prepared quantum systems leads in the end to a
collection of facts with the same histogram. It is this collection of facts given after the measurements that serves
to interpret the corresponding probability prediction and, thereby, the quantum state. (MI) obeys (F) exactly in
this way.
In order to consider the physical universe as a genuine quantum system, one either had to prepare it arbitrarily
often into the same state, or one had to prepare arbitrarily many universes of the same type into the same state.
In both cases, it is inconceivable in principle to register relative frequencies of facts after measurement, supposing
the total information about the universe is encoded in its state.
In the first case, the universe cannot remain in the same state as before a measurement and, at the same time,
exhibit the result of this measurement. In the second case, “reading off” relative frequencies contradicts (U): A
universe consisting of all physical objects and phenomena by definition, cannot be compared with additional facts
from “parallel universes”, that is, from “outside”.
Consequently, a collection of measurement results (in the sense explained above) for the system ”universe” cannot
consistently be conceived of. Therefore the concept “quantum state of the universe” is lacking a sound physical
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interpretation, taken for granted (F) and (MI). Roughly speaking, any proposal to provide this concept with
empirical significance is ruled out by the probabilistic character of quantum theory. It is not enough to refute
merely the more bizarre proposals (such as splitting the apparatus [10]). There is no way to appeal to a “quantum
state of the universe” within the methodological principles of physics.
We state some obvious but far-reaching consequences of this conclusion:
1. There has never been a “quantum state of the universe” in the past. The origin of the physical universe
cannot be explained from a quantum state alone, neither by amplitudes to appear from nothing [2] nor by
a hypothetical tunnelling phenomenon [11,5]. This conclusion does not depend on whether the universe is
open or closed, inflationary or not. There is no exclusively quantum-theoretical cosmogenesis on principle.
2. The physical universe as a whole is not subjected to a purely quantum-theoretical dynamics as was proposed
in [12]. In this sense, there is no strict quantum cosmology [13].
3. A “theory of everything” which aims at a description of all physical systems and their interactions [14] cannot
rely exclusively upon quantum-theoretical basic concepts. There is no quantum theory of gravity with an
interpretation which allows for a “quantum state of the universe”.
IV. DISCUSSION
The reasoning presented in the last section may give rise to a number of interesting questions, which we are
going to discuss now. In doing so, we want to anticipate and refute possible objections.
Question 1: If the need for empirical accessibility is taken seriously, then some kind of experimental arrangement,
shortly called “apparatus” in the following, is indispensable. Does not every physical description of the universe
necessarily comprise as part of the universe the apparatuses suitable to test this description? Isn’t this problem
even more fundamental than how to apply quantum theory to the universe as a whole? Isn’t a classical state of
the universe inconceivable as well?
Answer 1: We abstract from all concrete measurement methods. We push idealization even thus far as to neglect
the material configuration of the apparatus completely. In this vein, one can relate a physical description to
something empirically accessible in principle without explicitly paying attention to internal states of the apparatus
or to reactions of the apparatus to the system of interest. This stage of idealization is well suited to find out which
picture, or better caricature, of physical reality a theory permits. Thus, a classical pure state of the universe is
conceivable (and has indeed been conceived, as is well known, in the 19th century in the guise of the Laplacian
demon). Our reasoning against a quantum state of the universe notably holds true for every probability prediction
about the physical universe, be it of quantum origin or not. Consequently, there is also no classical mixed state of
the universe, whence cosmology cannot rely on probability densities on phase space.
Question 2: In contrast to classical physics, in quantum theory state transformations caused by apparatuses
play a central role. How can one then justify to establish quantum descriptions without explicitly incorporating
preparation and measurement apparatuses?
Answer 2: All you need is (F). In order to interpret probability predictions physically, it is indispensable to
consider collections of conceivable measurement results as facts. Usually these facts are read off the apparatuses,
but every description of apparatuses going beyond the facts themselves may fall victim to our idealization.
Question 3: Collections of measurement results can only be thought of as produced by repeated preparation and
measurement. Isn’t it, in view of such an ensemble interpretation [15], always (and not only for the universe as
defined by (U)) impossible to assign a quantum state to an individual system?
Answer 3: Whether or not a certain quantum state is given cannot be tested empirically in a single measurement
on an individual system. It is, however, not a priori meaningless to assign a certain quantum state to an individual
system, as long as one knows the preparation apparatus (whose state is, notably, not part of the quantum descrip-
tion). If it is a legitimate thought experiment to check at an infinite ensemble into which quantum state a specific
apparatus prepares, then it is also legitimate to ascribe this state to each and every individual system prepared by
this apparatus. There is no fundamental problem with this for microsystems, but there is one for the universe.
Question 4: The idealization relevant for interpretation extends so far as to make irrelevant the material config-
uration of apparatuses (Answer 1), as well as to legitimize thought experiments with infinite ensembles of quantum
systems (Answer 3). Why is it then forbidden to imagine an infinite multitude of identically prepared quantum
universes? Why should not different facts exist in different “parallel universes”?
Answer 4: Abstraction and idealization in physics lead only to simplified descriptions of what is empirically
accessible in principle. Because any view from outside the universe is inconceivable by the definition (U), a
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multitude of universes or a comparison between different universes remains forbidden, even if idealization is pushed
to the extreme. It is legitimate to imagine an infinite ensemble of electrons, only because it is conceivable in
principle to prepare many electrons (or one electron repeatedly) into the same state. For the universe, the situation
is fundamentally different. Even if the material configuration of apparatuses is completely neglected, there remains
a difference in their logical status: An apparatus for the observation of an electron is surely outside the electron,
but an apparatus for the observation of the universe is surely not outside the universe.
Question 5: The real structure of nature does not depend on definitions. Answer 4, however, seems to do so. Why
are cosmological scenarios excluded which involve a multitude of universes, each being part of nature? “Universe”
means “all embracing”, but why should a physical universe as an object of cosmology be literally everything?
Answer 5: One can, of course, give up (U) and use the word “universe” in a less embracing sense. But then,
our reasoning and conclusion remain valid for what was originally meant by (U).
Question 6: Real apparatuses consist of atoms, and atoms are undisputedly quantum systems. Why can one
then rely on facts to interpret quantum states without describing the emergence of these facts within the conceptual
frame of quantum theory? Doesn’t the whole reasoning rest on an artificial opposition between quantum predictions
and classical apparatuses due to over-idealization, and hence lack physical relevance?
Answer 6: Indeed, the application of (MI) presupposes that a collection of facts comes out of every sequence
of measurements. (MI) gives no hints on how these facts come into existence or on how their emergence could
be described theoretically. This notorious “quantum measurement problem” [16] cannot be solved or avoided
by explicitly taking into account the apparatus and the environment as quantum systems. In particular, purely
quantum-dynamical theories of decoherence [17] do not explain the emergence of facts in single measurements, not
even for all practical purposes. The idealization chosen here favours the sudden emergence of a definite fact in a
spontaneous quantum event [18] once a measurement is carried out on a quantum system. From then on the fact
persists. Conventional quantum theory expresses such an individual quantum event as a suitable state collapse.
Encouraged by these facts and in the tradition of Niels Bohr, we insist that the classical description of apparatuses
is a necessary independent input to every quantum description. By “classical” we do not refer to the laws of
classical physics, but only to the applicability of classical logic to the facts presupposed by (MI). The relevance of
these facts to interpretation is a direct consequence of (F).
Question 7: The unsatisfactory special role of the apparatuses and the desire for a description of the universe as
a closed quantum system have been two essential motivations for the development of the formalism of consistent
quantum histories [19]. Hasn’t the state concept lost its fundamental status in this modification of the quantum
formalism, so that the reasoning presented above has become obsolete?
Answer 7: Quantum probability goes without histories, mathematically [20] and physically. The formalism of
consistent quantum histories is burdened with a fundamental freedom of choice of a consistent family or a framework
[21]. Among the various imaginable quantum histories, there is no unique procedure to discriminate in a given
physical situation between facts and non-facts. In the histories formalism it is not unambiguously expressible that
one observable has an actual value due to the real experimental setup, while another (incompatible) one has not.
This is the ultimate reason why the histories approach has been criticized repeatedly [22]. Independently of its
applicability to the universe, the quantum-histories approach thus fails to satisfy principle (F). For this reason it
lacks a sound physical interpretation. This is fatal to the whole approach, but it is far from being acknowledged
by its adherents [23].
Finally, one could ask how to do cosmology at all in the era of quantum theory. We stress that this problem
appears to be puzzling only through the dogma of the universal applicability of quantum theory. In accordance
with Ludwig [6] and others, we suggest to drop this dogma. In the same way as the description of a quantum-
mechanical microsystem requires classical apparatuses as a fundamental concept, facts could come into play in
the description of the early universe and within grand-unification programs, as a fundamental concept apart from
quantum uncertainty. We think that this dichotomy is unavoidable. Moreover, it is by no means evident that all
physical systems must possess quantum states.
In conclusion, we have shown that the universe as a whole cannot be ascribed a quantum state with a sound
interpretation, irrespectively of specific cosmological models. Thus, it makes no sense to postulate such a state
hypothetically and treat it like a very complicated quantity, about which one doesn’t yet know enough. This
conclusion should serve as an interpretational boundary condition for working out cosmological theories. Its
enforcing character is based on conceptual and methodological rigor. This is a step beyond Occam’s razor, which
has so often been the main tool of heuristic argumentation against a multitude of universes: While the razor cuts
off only what is physically legitimate but redundant, the idea of an ensemble of universes is at best metaphysical.
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